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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
FROM ROME TO KAMPALA
JUDGE PHILIPPE KIRSCH, Q.C.*
FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Almost twelve years ago in Rome, a conference of 160 states
adopted the statute of a new international criminal court.1 Four
years later, the Statute entered into force, and the Court has now
been in operation for seven years. A Review Conference is about to
take place in Kampala, Uganda, as mandated by the Rome
Statute. 2
I.

ROME CONFERENCE

Before turning to the achievements, challenges and future of
the International Criminal Court (ICC), let us recall what the
Rome Conference really tried to achieve.
The basic goal was clear, of course: to create a permanent
institution that would dispense with the need to create a special
tribunal every time genocide, war crimes or crimes against
humanity were committed because the national systems having
jurisdiction did not work as they should. Unfortunately, history
clearly shows that national systems are least able or willing to
play their role when the most serious crimes are committed. You
need only think of Nazi Germany, Cambodia, Uganda under Idi
Amin, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia to illustrate the point.
Over time, the new court would have an effect of prevention
by signaling to would-be perpetrators that impunity was no longer
guaranteed or acceptable. Ultimately, by the effect of its existence

* Judge Kirsch. Q.C., is currently Judge ad hoc at the International Court
of Justice in the case concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal). From 2003 to 2009, he was
President of the International Criminal Court and a Judge of its Appeals
Chamber. From 1972 to 2003, he worked at the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade of Canada where he occupied, in particular, the
positions of Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to
the United Nations (1988-1992), Director General of the Bureau of Legal
affairs (1992-1994), Legal Advisor to the Department (1994-1999), and
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden (1999-2003).
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute entered into force
on July 1, 2002.
2. Id. art. 123(1).
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and action, the court would contribute to the peace, security, and
well-being of the world, which were threatened by those crimes, as
explicitly recognized in the preamble of the Statute.3 The court
would be created by treaty and voluntarily adhered to, to avoid the
stigma of imposition by a group of states on another.
In addition, it would only act when the state having
jurisdiction could not or would not carry out its own
responsibilities. The ICC is an instrument of last resort. This
fundamental principle, called complementarity, distinguishes the
ICC from the ad hoc tribunals established by the United Nations
Security Council ("Security Council"), which have priority over
national systems. The very phrasing of the relevant article puts
the burden of proof on the Court, as it were: "the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible" where national procedures
have been undertaken, "unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." 4 It
therefore concedes the primacy of national systems while at the
same time assigning an important function to the ICC in
determining when these systems have failed to discharge their
responsibility to bring perpetrators to justice.
That much was generally granted as the Rome Conference
began. But then, what kind of court did states really want? Here
things became more complicated. The creation of the Court had
become irresistible as a result of the momentum that then had
developed behind international justice, but states had very
different ideas about some of the basic parameters.
A. JurisdictionalIssues

The vast majority of states wanted a court that was strong,
independent and ready to intervene as required without too many
constraints. For example, they wanted a Prosecutor who had the
power to trigger the jurisdiction of the court. They favoured a
jurisdictional formula akin to universal jurisdiction for the court
and a limited role for the Security Council. On the other hand, an
influential minority wanted the future court to be subject to
significant constraints over the exercise of its jurisdiction and
some form of political control, preferably the Security Council,
with a straitjacket on the Prosecutor's powers. There was a third,
smaller but very vocal group of states, which firmly disliked both
the prospects of an independent court and any role for the Security
Council. Those states clamoured for protection of sovereignty and
initially objected, for example, to crimes committed in internal
conflicts being subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the absence of effective negotiation on those issues, the
3. Id. pmbl.
4. Id. art. 17(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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draft statute that was eventually proposed by the Bureau of the
Committee of the Whole of the Conference and adopted as the
Rome Statute was an attempt to achieve an acceptable balance
among all those positions, that is, a system that would not
automatically espouse the majority position but seek an
equilibrium that would make the court viable.
That is why the ICC does not exercise universal jurisdiction,
which was preferred by many states but strongly opposed by some,
and only exercises its jurisdiction with the consent of either the
state of the territory where the crime was committed or the state
of the nationality of the accused-the two classical and bestaccepted grounds for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
everywhere. 5 That is why the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes
committed after entry into force of the Statute, without any
retroactivity. 6 That is why a referral by the Security Council is not
required but possible, 7 and why the Security Council may also
request the ICC to defer proceedings in certain circumstances. 8
That is why the Prosecutor is empowered to start an investigation
in a situation that has not been referred to the Court either by a
state or by the Security Council, but only with the authorization of
a Pre-Trial Chamber.9
B.

Crimes

The question of which crimes should be subject to the
jurisdiction of the ICC was difficult but more extensively and more
constructively negotiated than other jurisdictional issues.10
Whether the list of crimes included in the Statute was generally
acceptable was not entirely certain at the end of the Rome
Conference because the Rome Statute was voted on as a package,
without separate votes on discrete issues. But that became quite
clear when the Elements of Crimes, which contain a detailed
description of all crimes, were adopted by consensus by the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court
("Preparatory Commission")" in June 2000 and by the Assembly of
States Parties (ASP) in September 2002.12
5. Id. art. 12(2).
6. Id. art. 11.
7. Id. art. 13(b).
8. Id. art. 16.
9. Id. arts. 13(c), 15.
10. See id. arts. 5-8 (concerning the crimes under the jurisdiction of the
ICC).
11. The Preparatory Commission was created at the Rome Conference.
Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/10/Annex I/Res. F (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Final Act of the
Rome Conference].
12. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 9, 112. The Elements of Crimes were
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Yet, some crimes proposed by states, which were dear to the
hearts of many were not included in the Statute or could not be
defined. The crime of aggression was the most important. Many
states considered it as "the supreme crime" but could not agree
either on its definition or the conditions of exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction over that crime, that is what mechanism should be
used for the determination that an act of aggression had been
committed by a state against another before the ICC could
undertake criminal proceedings against an individual allegedly
responsible for a crime of aggression committed in that context.
This issue generated considerable divisions among states. Some,
notably but not exclusively the permanent members of the
Security Council, argued for the exclusive responsibility of the
Security Council in determining an act of aggression. Others,
however, were concerned that the Security Council tended to avoid
making such determinations for political reasons even in clear
cases of aggression. They therefore favoured some alternative
mechanism in case of inaction of the Security Council. Such a
mechanism could take the form, for example, of an advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly or a decision of a Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC. The crime of aggression was then included
among the crimes listed in the Statute, but the ICC could only
exercise its jurisdiction once a provision was adopted resolving the
pending issues. 13
The Conference also declined to include terrorism and drug
trafficking. As in the case of the crime of aggression, the problem
of definition played a major role in the case of terrorism, but there
were broader issues as well. Those crimes were seen by most
states as being capable of resolution through bilateral or regional
cooperation without the need for involvement of an international
court. Also, there were questions at the time whether they were of
comparable gravity to the "core crimes." Yet, the matter was not
closed for the future. A resolution was adopted recommending that
a review conference review those crimes with a view of arriving at
an acceptable definition and including that definition in the
Statute.14
A final issue related to crimes was a last minute concession
allowing a state to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the Court for
war crimes for a period of seven years after entry into force of the
Statute for that state. The Statute provided explicitly that the first
(and only mandatory) Review Conference would review that
provision (Article 124).
adopted by the ASP on Sept. 9, 2002. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Elements of

Crimes, ICC Doc.ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part.II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002).
13. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5(1)(d), 5(2).
14. Final Act of the Rome Conference, supra note 11, Annex I/Res. E.
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The need to review Article 124 and the list of crimes was the
original rationale for a review conference seven years after entry
into force of the Statute. While the mandate of the Review
Conference is not completely exclusive, the formulation of the
relevant provision of the Statute reflects a clear orientation. Not
only is the primary purpose of the Conference defined narrowly to
"consider any amendments to the Statute," but its more specific
object is unmistakably suggested: "such review may include, but is
not limited to the list of crimes contained in article 5."15 We will
see that subsequent events profoundly altered the goals and
nature of the Conference.

C. Functioningof the Court
Despite all those differences, there is one principle on which
all states agreed: the ICC should be exclusively and strictly
judicial. There could be no risk that it might become a political
organ. More than that, it should be subject to a detailed set of
rules that ensured that it would behave as predictably as possible.
That concern was in part a question of principle, and in part
the consequence of the fact that the ICC would be neither
comfortably limited to past crimes, nor to well-defined situations
or regions. The scope of its activities was entirely unpredictable.
States felt that unpredictability in the exercise of jurisdiction
should be compensated by high predictability in its behaviour. In
addition, some aspects of the system were entirely new and
therefore untested at the international level, such as the creation
of a Pre-Trial Chamber and the right for victims to participate in
proceedings and to receive reparations. Finally, as different legal
cultures struggled to develop a coherent, mutually compatible
procedural system within a very short time, states tended to err on
the side of overabundance of details to ensure everything was
covered and minimize the possibilities of clashes. Whether the mix
was always adequate, remains to be seen.
For those reasons, states developed a statute that is
considerably lengthier, more detailed, and more procedural than
that of any special international tribunal. Not content with that,
the Statute also gave states the responsibility to draft the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, an exercise which had been left to judges
for every other international tribunal. This was part of the
mandate of the Preparatory Commission.' 6
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 123(1) (stating, "[s]even years after the
entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this
Statute. Such review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes
contained in article 5.")
16. Final Act of the Rome Conference, supra note 11, Annex I/Res. F5(a).
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted by the ASP on Sept. 9,
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The positive aspect of this approach is that states took real
ownership of the system and created certainty on the principles to
be applied. The downside was the creation of a system which is
complex and rigid, not always easy to apply in practice-as evident
from the jurisprudence of the Court-and even more difficult to
change.17 As a separate point to which I will return, the whole
system also rests on the cooperation of states for anything that is
not purely the judicial and administrative functioning of the
court.1 8
This system has been in existence for a few years now. I
would preface the rest of my presentation with a simple statement:
the responsibility, indeed the obligation, of the ICC is to apply the
Rome Statute and related instruments as they are written, not as
the judges, the Prosecutor, states, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), or academia wish they had been written. Of course, given
the number of difficulties in interpreting the constitutive
instruments, the Court should strive to achieve workable
proceedings and reconcile apparent inconsistencies but always
within the parameters as defined by the Rome Conference.
Pragmatism cannot be at the price of violation or expansion of its
mandate. The credibility of international justice largely depends
on that. This, of course, does not mean those instruments should
not be reviewed and improved in due course.
So far, I have described the decisions made by states. But
there were also widespread expectations: for example, that states
would refer other states' situations to the Court but not their own;
that a referral of a situation by the Security Council would be a
rare occurrence; and that the Prosecutor, having been given the
hard fought right to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court, would
avail himself of that possibility early on. Perhaps also that the ICC
would find itself essentially in the position of the Nuremberg
tribunal-that it would be seized of situations after a conflict was
over, with evidence and witnesses readily available. Any such
expectations were disproved by reality.
II. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE COURT
A. Situations and Cases
Since 2003, four situations have been referred by the Court:
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, The Central
African Republic (CAR), and Darfur, Sudan. The Security Council
2002. ICC-ASP, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3
(Part.II-A) (Sept. 9, 2002).
17. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 51(2), 121, 122 (describing the
procedure for amending the Rome Statue and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence).
18. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pts. 9, 10.
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referred Darfur to the Court but the other situations were referred
not by third-party states but by the states concerned themselves,
the so-called self-referrals. As I mentioned in the context of the
Rome Conference, self-referrals were not expected. An
investigation has now been undertaken in a fifth situation, that of
post-election violence in Kenya, following authorization by a PreTrial Chamber of a request by the Prosecutor to that effect.19
Most cases involve warlords and militia leaders. But in the
situation of the CAR, the accused is a former senator and vicepresident of DRC.20 In the case of Darfur, the accused include a
minister of the Sudanese Government and, of course, President
Bashir himself.21 Thirteen arrest warrants have been issued by
pre-trial chambers, but only four have been executed. This is
evidently an unsatisfactory situation which will need to be
corrected if the Court is to keep its effectiveness and credibility.
In the four situations referred to the Court, a number of
charges have been approved by pre-trial chambers. They are
limited to conscription and use of child soldiers in the case of
Thomas Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda in the DRC situation, 22 but
include in all others a combination of war crimes and crimes
against humanity: murder, rape, sexual slavery, intentional
attacks of civilians, pillaging, destruction of property, exploitation
of children, and other violations of humanitarian law. In some
cases there are also charges of torture, cruel treatment, inhumane
acts, and forced displacement of populations. 23 In the case of
President Bashir, the Prosecutor requested a charge of genocide,

19. ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Request for authorization of an
investigation pursuant to Article 15, ICC Doc. ICC-01/09-3 (Nov. 26, 2009);
ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Rome Statute of the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ICC Doc. ICC-01/09-19 (Mar. 31, 2010).
20. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-1/08-15tENG, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo replacing the one
issued on May 23, 2008 (June 10, 2008).
21. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun ("Ahmad Harun") and Ali
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb"), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07-2,
Warrant for Arrest for Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Warrant for
Harun]; Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar Al Bashir"),
Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1,Warrant of Arrest for Omar Al Bashir, (Mar. 4,
2009) [hereinafter Warrant for Al Bashir].
22. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803tEN, Decision on the confirmation of charges, (Jan. 29, 2007); Prosecutor v.
Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2-tENG, Warrant of Arrest (Aug.
22, 2006).
23. Warrant for Al Bashir, supra note 21, at 6; Warrant for Harun, supra
note 21, at 7; Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and
Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph
Kony issued on 8th July 2005 as amended on 27th September 2005, T 19
(Sept. 27, 2005).
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which was not approved by the Pre-Trial Chamber.24 The Appeals
Chamber overturned that decision on the grounds that the
standard of evidence used by the Pre-Trial Chamber was too
high. 25 The Appeals Chamber made no finding of genocide itself
but directed the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the issue using a
different standard.
B. ProsecutorProprio Motu Powers

As mentioned earlier, the Prosecutor has so far used his
proprio motu power to start an investigation subject to the
authorisation of a Pre-Trial Chamber once, in the case of postelection violence in Kenya.
However, the Prosecutor has been receiving thousands of
communications containing requests to start investigations in a
number of other situations. 26 Most communications were
dismissed as failing to meet the requirements of the Statute, for
example, allegations of crimes not included in the Rome Statute,
allegations relating to events that took place before July 2002, or
situations where the Court did not have the consent of either the
state of nationality of the accused or the state of the territory of
the crime.
Yet, the Prosecutor has been analyzing other situations. In
2006, in two such situations, he announced his decision not to
start an investigation. In the cases of allegations of war crimes
against British soldiers in Iraq, he concluded that there was only a
reasonable basis to believe that there were four to twelve victims
of willful killing and a limited number of victims of inhuman
treatment, totaling less than twenty in all, that the gravity of the
allegations was too low to justify ICC intervention, and that
national proceedings had been commenced in each instance. 27 In
the case of Venezuela, he similarly concluded that the alleged
crimes fell short of the threshold of crimes against humanity. 28 In

24. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar Al Bashir"), Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-2-Conf, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
22 (Mar. 4,
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,
2009). A public redacted version was filed under the number ICC-02/05-01/093.
25. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ("Omar Al Bashir"), Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the
"Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir," 10 (Feb. 3, 2010).
26. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (describing the powers of the
Prosecutor).
27. ICC, OTP response to communication received concerning Iraq, at 8-9
(Feb. 9, 2006).
28. ICC, OTP response to communication received concerning Venezuela, at
4 (Sept. 2, 2006).
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other situations, he has continued to analyze the information
received and has been in contact with various states and other
entities. This is the case of situations in Afghanistan, Colombia,
Georgia, Palestine, and Guinea. The main objective of the
Prosecutor appears to be less about bringing new situations to the
Court and more about encouraging and, if possible, assisting the
beginning of national proceedings, consistent with the basic
principle that the first responsibility for the repression of any
crimes belongs to states. 29

C. Conduct of Proceedings
In those first years, the Court conducted a great number of
proceedings. The majority has been at the pre-trial level and in the
form of interlocutory appeals, but it also started two trials, those
of Lubanga and Katanga-Ngudjolo in DRC and is expecting
another, that of Bemba in the CAR situation. Many proceedings so
far concerned procedural issues such as victims' participation and
disclosure of evidence. Were those proceedings fair? Were they
efficient?
1.

Fairness

There is little question that in all those cases, the ICC has
strictly adhered to the mandate that it was given in Rome, and
particularly that it has conducted itself with great concern for due
process and, in particular, the rights of the accused. There are
many illustrations of this.
A well known example occurred at the beginning of the
Lubanga trial. In 2008, the Prosecutor was unable to release
before the Trial Chamber information obtained in confidence from
certain sources and containing exonerating evidence he was
obliged to divulge. 30 This problem led to a stay of proceedings and
to a decision by the Trial Chamber to release Mr. Lubanga
unconditionally, which were respectively confirmed and quashed
by the Appeals Chamber. 3 1 Eventually, the problem was resolved
29. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a) (stating that a case in
inadmissible when it is being "investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it").
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(3)(e) (stating that the
Prosecutor may not disclose information for the purpose or generating new
evidence); see also id. art. 67(2) (stating that the Prosecutor shall disclose
evidence that shows innocence or mitigates the guilt of the accused).
31. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401,
Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials
covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the
prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, IT 92-97 (June 13, 2008); Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1418, Prosecution's Appeal
against "Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo" and Urgent
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and the trial began. At the time, that situation understandably
caused considerable concern, but it also showed that the judges
would fully ensure the Court's obligation to respect due process
and the rights of the accused.
Another illustration is that a number of charges have not
been accepted in different cases, showing the judges of the PreTrial Chamber are fulfilling this screening function. In the case of
Abu Garda, who was accused of certain war crimes committed
during an attack against the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS), the charges were dismissed entirely. 32
On the basis of my six years on the Appeals Chamber of the
ICC, I can testify first-hand that the judges there were extremely
careful to avoid any possibility that a procedural issue might turn
out to be detrimental to the accused or, generally, the fairness of
the process, and that remains true today.
2. Efficiency
Efficiency (or expeditiousness) has been more problematic.
The ICC is widely and correctly seen as operating more slowly
than special tribunals. This situation is due to several factors.
Strategic decisions by parties and less than efficient working
methods have certainly played a role and need to be reviewed and
corrected. Yet, the ICC is also in a very special situation that has
created its own obstacles, at least for now.
To begin with, the system is complicated and cumbersome.
The ICC does not inherit tailor-made situations. First, it has the
obligation to determine whether any new situation from scratch
meets the requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility. Then, it
has the double requirement of pre-trial and trial phases, which, in
the view of a number of observers, have involved not only a pretrial phase which is too long and elaborate, but also a degree of
overlapping and duplication between the two phases. Victims'
participation is entirely new and has raised any number of issues
at all levels.
Other reasons are external. The ICC has yet to receive a
situation that would be comparable to Nuremberg or even to the
various special tribunals that have been established since the

Application for Suspensive Effect (July 2, 2008); Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the appeal of
the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on
the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article
54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused,
together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June
2008", J 42-56 (Oct. 21, 2008).
32. Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09-243Red, Public Redacted Version-Decision of the Confirmation of Charges, 1 236
(Feb. 8, 2010).

2010]

From Rome to Kampala

525

early nineties. The ICC has been mostly operating in situations of
ongoing conflicts, where logistics and security raise inordinate
problems. Many of the issues of disclosure of evidence that have
come up are the result of the dual obligation of the ICC to respect
the rights of the defendant and to protect the security of victims
and witnesses.
In sum, responsibilities are shared. On the one hand, the ICC
has a lot to learn in becoming more efficient. It clearly should
continuously review its working methods and the length of
decisions, for example. It is to be hoped that the development of its
jurisprudence and working improvements will gradually eliminate
obstacles and lead the way to solutions that are both legally sound
and practical. On the other hand, whatever the ICC does, it is
essential to keep in mind at all times that for the system to be
viable the two pillars of the ICC system, court and states, must
each do their part.
D. Support
Adherence to the Rome Statute has increased faster than
anyone anticipated in Rome. One hundred eleven states have now
ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute, within a few years of its
adoption in 1998. As a point of comparison, only sixty-six states
have accepted as compulsory the jurisdiction of the ICJ after more
than sixty years of existence. This remarkable speed is the result
in part of wide acceptance of the need for an ICC and in part of
demonstration by the Court of strictly judicial conduct.
Nevertheless, acceptance of the ICC is regionally uneven. The
Middle East and Asia in particular are insufficiently represented.
Moving beyond purely regional concerns, three of the five
permanent members of the Security Council still have not ratified
the Rome Statute; nor have two important nuclear-weapons
States: India and Pakistan. Over time, that situation will need to
be corrected if the ICC is to have the global reach it has been
created for and avoid perceptions of selectivity.
The need for practical support for the ICC and the importance
of state cooperation has been reiterated by State Parties every
year, at the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and at the UN. Yet,
support in practice is uneven and fragile. The ICC's dependence on
states in the difficult circumstances in which it operates makes it
vulnerable. The small number of arrests actually executed is a
case in point, as is the small number of those essential agreements
on relocation of victims and witnesses and enforcement of
sentences, without mentioning the paucity of implementing
legislation or agreements on privileges and immunities. This
raises two fundamental issues for the future of the Court to which
I will return in the context of the Kampala Conference:
cooperation and complementarity.
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E. A Judicial Institution in a PoliticalEnvironment

Before turning to the Kampala Conference and the future,
there remains one issue which is a very difficult problem facing
the Court: the fact that it operates in a political environment.
Broadly speaking, the ICC is better accepted today than at
the time of its creation, largely because it has proven itself as a
judicial institution. I already mentioned the rapid development of
ratifications, but it is also cooperating with non-state parties and
those contacts are increasing.
The United States' (US's) position was mentioned in the call
for this Conference. I will leave it to others to elaborate on that but
I would simply signal here a couple of points. One is that the US's
initial outright opposition to the ICC began to diminish a few
years ago, long before the current administration came into play.
There are various reasons for this, but certainly one of them was
that as the Court developed it became clear that stated
apprehensions that it would act in a political manner, let alone
target deliberately certain states or regions, had no foundation. A
decision to ratify the Statute or not is a sovereign decision that
belongs to the US. But I hope and believe that at the very least
there is now firm ground for development of cooperation on the
part of this country. Recent statements by the US Ambassador-atLarge for War Crimes Issue are encouraging in this regard. 33
More broadly, the reality of the situations in which the ICC is
involved has shown that the challenges it faces go far beyond
practical difficulties. As in the case of other international
tribunals, it carries out its activities in implementing its mandate
in the context of past or present conflicts, domestic or
international, which are very fresh in people's minds or even
ongoing and are all linked to national or regional political issues.
In other words, the ICC is a judicial institution operating in a
political environment. This has led to important fluctuations in
the support the ICC has received, both at the national and the
international level. It challenges the growing conviction at the
roots of international criminal justice that there can be no lasting
peace without justice. Indeed international justice, which does not
pick its moment, is sometimes seen or presented as an impediment
to an ongoing peace or reconciliation process. The ICC has faced
this problem several times. This can result in divisions among
states and an occasionally ambivalent attitude, even amongst
those who have provided principled and practical support to
international justice.
33. See Interview by Christiane Amanpour with Stephen Rapp, US
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (Mar. 24, 2010) available at
http://archives.cnn.com/ TRANSCRIPTS/1003/24 /ampr.01.html (discussing
the US's increased cooperation and engagement with the ICC).
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An illustration of this at the national level was in Uganda.
The arrest warrants issued by the ICC largely contributed to lead
the self-described Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to negotiations
for a peace settlement with the Government of Uganda, which was
immediately accompanied by a drop in the commission of crimes.
Later on, however, the LRA kept abandoning the peace process
ostensibly on the grounds that the ICC would not withdraw its
arrest warrants. The ICC, being a court, obviously could not
withdraw arrest warrants for reasons of convenience. This led to a
lasting argument in Uganda as to whether the ICC's intervention
had a positive or negative effect on the situation on the ground.
The question of the relationship between peace and justice found
itself in other situations as well.
At the international level, the most flagrant clash between
politics and international justice has been in the Darfur situation.
The arrest warrant issued against President Al Bashir of Sudan
has proved to be very controversial. The controversy is not really
about the findings or the reasoning of the Court. Those are largely
being avoided in discussions. It ranges from concerns that the
arrest warrant may compromise efforts to reach peace and
reconciliation in Darfur to allegations made against the Court on
various political grounds. The African Union (AU) called upon its
member states last summer to refrain from cooperating with the
ICC in this particular situation, after failing to obtain from the
Security Council a request to the Court to suspend its
proceedings.34
Such situations are inevitably accompanied by the
temptation, or even a deliberate attempt, to paint international
justice in political colours. No international court has been able to
escape that entirely-not the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, not the ICC. Paradoxically, many arguments against
the ICC amount to suggesting that its judges somehow should take
into account extra-legal considerations in deciding on matters of
law. That is exactly what the drafters of the Rome Statute,
including states engaged in the current controversy, were so
determined to avoid, as I mentioned at the beginning of my
intervention.
Be that as it may, this problem has resulted in divisions
among states and an occasionally ambivalent attitude, even
amongst those who have provided principled and practical support
to international justice. The issue of the relationship between
peace and justice will be examined at the Kampala Conference, as
34. Assembly of the African Union[AU], Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Sirte,
Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Decision on the Report of the
Commission on the Meeting of African States Partiesto the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal (ICC), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XIII) (July
3, 2009).
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well as the broader question of the impact of the ICC on local
populations.

III.

KAMPALA CONFERENCE

What can we expect from the Kampala Conference regarding
the issues we have discussed so far?
The situation is such that the Kampala Conference will be
very different from what was anticipated in Rome. It will to some
extent deal with its original mandate, but will also address other
issues that have emerged in the cold light of the reality of the first
years of the Court.
A. Crimes and Other Proposals
We have seen that a Review Conference was mandated by the
Rome Conference seven years after entry into force of the Statute.
As already mentioned, strictly speaking, the primary purpose of
the Conference was narrow: to "consider any amendments to [the]
Statute."35 "Such review may include, but is not limited to the list
of crimes contained in article 5."36 Its only legally mandatory task
is to review Article 124, which gives a state the possibility to reject
the jurisdiction of the Court over war crimes for seven years after
entry into force of the statute for that state. The resolution
convening the Review Conference includes a proposal to delete
Article 124 altogether. 37
The second issue Kampala will need to deal with is the crime
of aggression. Neither Article 5 of the Rome Statute nor the
relevant resolution adopted by the Rome Conference specifically
requires that aggression should be reviewed at the first Review
Conference, 38 but it is necessary to do so, given the profile of the
issue. 39 The crime of aggression was of enormous importance in
Rome for many states, which felt it was the cause of most other
crimes. The Preparatory Commission, which was required to work
on it, made very little progress. The ASP took the matter over and
fared better. A draft definition of the crime is attached to the
resolution adopted at the last session of the ASP as well as a series

35. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 123(1).
36.
37.
2009)
38.

Id.
ICC-ASP Eighth Session, Res. ICC-ASP/8/Res.6, Annex I (Nov. 26,
[hereinafter ASP Resolution 6].
Final Act of Rome Conference, supra note 11, Annex I/Res. F(7) ("The

Commission shall prepare proposals for a provision on aggression .

. .

. The

Commission shall submit such proposals to the Assembly of States Parties at a
Review Conference, with a view to arriving at an acceptable provision on the
crime of aggression for inclusion in this Statute.") (emphasis added).
39. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the lack of definition for the crime of
aggression).
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of options for the conditions of exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. 40
En clair, as already mentioned,41 those options reflect a deep
difference between those states that consider that the Court can
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression only if the
Security Council has determined there was an act of aggression
and those that feel there should be alternative triggers, such as a
resolution of the UN General Assembly, an advisory opinion of the
ICJ, or a determination made by a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC.
Proposals, options, and draft elements of crimes are included in
the resolution convening the Review Conference as a proposal by
Lichtenstein. 42
With respect to other crimes, a number of proposals have
been made by states: adding chemical and biological weapons and
anti-personnel mines to the list of prohibited weapons and
extending certain existing prohibitions to non-international
conflicts such as poisonous weapons (Belgium and other
sponsors); 43 including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
as a war crime (Mexico); 44 inclusion of the crime of terrorism in
Article 5, subject to its definition, along the lines of the crime of
aggression (Netherlands);45 and including the crime of
international drug trafficking in Article 5 (Trinidad and Tobago).46
Different kinds of proposals were also made. Norway made a
proposal extending to an international or regional organisation,
arrangement, or agency the possibility of making a prison facility
available to the Court.47 Finally, a proposal was made by the AU,
to amend Article 16 of the Rome Statute in order to allow the UN
General Assembly to defer cases for one year in the case where the
Security Council would have failed to make a decision within a
specified timeframe.48
Faced with all those proposals, the ASP has taken a cautious
approach to the Kampala Conference. It decided that for an issue
to be submitted to the Conference, it should have been subject to
40. ICC-ASP Eighth Session, Report of the Bureau on the Review
Conference-Addendum, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/43/Add.1, Annex II (Nov. 10,
2009) [hereinafter Report of the Bureau on the Review ConferenceAddendum]; ASP Resolution 6, supra note 37, Annex II.
41. See supra Part I.B. (discussing states' differing opinions regarding the
crime of aggression).
42. ASP Resolution 6, supra note 37, Annex II. The Permanent
Representative of Lichtenstein to the United Nations, currently President of
the ASP, chaired the ASP Special Working Group on the crime of aggression.
43. Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference-Addendum, supra note
40, Annex I.
44. Id. Annex III.
45. Id. Annex IV.
46. Id. Annex VI.
47. Id. Annex V.
48. ICC-ASP Eighth Session, Official Records, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/20,
Annex II, App. VI.
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intensive preparations and should have a good chance to attract
consensus.49 As a result, the proposal made by the AU and all
proposals for inclusion of new crimes have been eliminated
because they raised controversial issues, with the exception of a
Belgian proposal aimed at including a prohibition of poisonous and
other weapons in non-international conflicts, similar to that
already existing in international conflicts.50 The Norwegian
proposal has been modified into a proposed draft resolution as it
was considered an amendment that was unnecessary5
The decision of the ASP to postpone a number of issues
beyond Kampala is causing no harm. Any session of the ASP can
take up and deal with an amendment without any need to convene
another review conference. 52 Indeed, that decision is probably
wise. The experience of the first few years of the Court clearly
shows that other priorities have emerged that were not
anticipated at the time of the Rome Conference.
B. The Functioningof the Court
The original purpose of a review conference being so curtailed,
the Kampala Conference then must turn its attention to subjects
that were not anticipated in Rome. An obvious candidate should be
the functioning of the Court. More specifically, what are the
lessons that can be learned at this stage on the parts of the system
established by constitutive instruments that work satisfactorily
and those parts that should be reviewed? But that cannot be fully
done either, because the Court has developed more slowly than
anticipated and, not having completed a full cycle of proceedings
including final appeals, is not in a position to make itself a
considered assessment. This in itself is not fatal since the ASP can
launch such a consideration at any time. Indeed, it is probably
preferable not to rush into attempts to bring formal modifications
to the constitutive instruments. As I mentioned earlier, both the
Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are
difficult to amend and most amendments, even if adopted, would
taken an enormous amount of time to enter into force. If other
ways can be found to improve the system, so much the better.

49. ICC-ASP Eighth Session,

Report of the Bureau on the Review

Conference, 2, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/43 (Nov. 15, 2009).
50. ASP Resolution 6, supra note 37, Annex III; ICC-ASP Eighth Session,
Resolution on the Review Conference, 1 9 and Annex VIII, ICC Doc. ICCASP/8/Res.9 (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Resolution on the Review
Conference].
51. Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference-Addendum, supra note
40, Annex V; Resolution on the Review Conference, supra note 50, 1 7 and
Annex V.
52. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(1)(2)(3).
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C. Stocktaking
The ASP then decided that, in addition to a general debate,
there would be an exercise of stocktaking that would focus on four
themes: complementarity, cooperation, impact of the Court, and
the major issue of the relationship between peace and justice, with
special reference to the need to take into account "aspects
regarding universality, implementation and lessons learned, in
order to enhance the work of the Court."53 The ASP is currently
preparing for the Review Conference in all those areas. 54
All those issues are important. Complementarity and
cooperation touch directly on relations between the ICC and states
and the functioning of the Court. Outstanding issues to be dealt
with in those areas have been well identified over the past few
years without being resolved. The impact of the Court on victims
and affected communities and the relationship between peace and
justice in many ways go beyond the ICC itself to reach
international justice more generally and need to be addressed
thoroughly.
Ultimately, the Kampala Conference will be a success if two
conditions are met. First, the Conference should not be seen as an
end in itself. Whatever may be achieved at the Conference, it will
be most important that it also provide proper directions for the
future. Second, whatever the formal outcome of discussions of the
four issues grouped under "stocktaking," such as conference
resolutions, should not be allowed to remain pro forma results, but
otherwise remain dead letter. Follow-up is essential. Weaknesses
in the area of cooperation, for example, are well known and should
be addressed in practice, not only recognized once again.
IV. CONCLUSION
International justice has made enormous advances in the past
fifteen years, advances that many countries and regions have
welcomed and benefited from. At the level of principle, the
principle that heinous crimes must be punished has gained
widespread acceptance. The debate now is largely about timing of

53. ASP Resolution 6, supra note 37, 1 5 and Annex IV; Resolution on the
Review Conference, supra note 50, 1 3, 4, and 8 and Annexes I-IV and VI-VII.
54. See generally ICC-ASP Resumed Eighth Session, Report of the Bureau
on stocktaking: Complementarity: Taking stock of the principle of
complementarity: bridging the impunity gap, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/8/51 (Mar. 18,
2010); ICC-ASP Resumed Eighth Session, Report of the Bureau on stocktaking:
Cooperation, Background paper and proposals for outcome, ICC Doc. ICCASP/8/50 (Mar. 18, 2010); ICC-ASP Resumed Eighth Session, Report of the
Bureau on stocktaking: The impact of the Rome Statute system on victims and
affected communities, ICC-ASP/8/49 (Mar. 18, 2010); ICC-ASP Resumed
Eighth Session, Report on the Bureau on stocktaking: Peace and Justice, ICCASP/8/52 (Mar. 20, 2010).
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justice, not defense of impunity. Institutionally, the establishment
of the ICC has finally provided a permanent instrument which
was long needed. There is no question that the system could be
improved, but its success depends more on a proper environment
than on technical improvements.
Some benefits of international justice can now be seen. One is
a measure of prevention, still limited but observable empirically,
not merely theoretical. It can be seen in some of the situations that
have been referred to the Court, for example, in a reduction of the
commission of certain crimes such as child recruitment in some
areas. It can also be seen in the number of references made around
the world not only to the ICC but to international justice
generally, starting with international humanitarian law.
That leads me again to the fundamental principle of
complementarity.55 One of the benefits of international justice has
been to encourage the development of national justice.
International justice, including the ICC, will never be able to deal
with more than a few situations at a time-and a few cases within
those situations. The rest will have to be done domestically, and
for that national systems need to function. The ICC Prosecutor has
clearly engaged into a process of encouraging the development and
action of effective national justice, through what he calls positive
complementarity. Some organisations, intergovernmental and
non-governmental, are working in the same direction, but this is a
massive exercise that should be much more widely shared.
Yet, there are cases where international justice itself needs to
be resorted to. Indeed, it is necessary that the ICC in particular
does not content itself to exist without acting, lest the impact it
has had on prevention of crimes and improvements in national
systems be eroded absent any pressure. We have learned from the
experience of the ICC and its predecessors what some of the
practical challenges are in exercising their responsibilities. In
addition, as I have also mentioned, we need to be aware of the
difficulties stemming from the volatile political environment in
which these organizations operate. They do not operate in a
vacuum but rather depend on the political environment for
support, as well as non-interference with the judicial process.
These two pillars of the international system, the political
and the judicial, will have their best effects if they are in sync. One
of the remaining challenges to harmonizing these pillars is that
international justice is still poorly known and understood. It has
remained so far, to a large extent, a world of specialists from
governments, NGOs, legal practitioners, and academia. To realise

55. See Rome Statute, supra note 1 (stating that a case is inadmissible in
the Court when it is being prosecuted or investigated by a state that has
jurisdiction).
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its full potential, indeed to receive the support it requires, it needs
to be streamlined and mainstreamed into other discourses of
international law and politics. The ICC and issues of international
justice more broadly are still not always on the radar of states and
international organizations. There have been some positive
developments, for example, significant attention was given to
issues of international justice in a UN handbook for those involved
in peace negotiations. 56 International justice is now better
recognized than in the past, but it is not always well understood.
The substance of international criminal law-what it requires, its
limitations and the limitations of its institutions-is not
sufficiently known. In that connection, there persists great
confusion between the political and the judicial, blaming
international justice for not assuming a role that belongs to
political organs, notably the Security Council.
It took a long time to create international justice; it will take
a long time for international justice to play its role fully. In the
meantime, we can work collectively to develop the best possible
understanding of its capacity and limits, and contribute to its
knowledge and dissemination. Constructive criticism is necessary
but not sufficient. It needs to be supplemented by a true
commitment to make international justice work. States in
particular must remember that international justice, and the ICC
system in particular, is their own creation, and that they will need
to take genuine ownership for it to develop and bring about the
benefits it was intended to bring to future generations.

56. See generally U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
[OCHA], Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed
(preparedby G. McHugh and M. Bessler).
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